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Survival of the Bargaining
Agreement: The Effect of Burns
Charles G. Bakaly, Jr.*
James S. Bryan**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Through a merger, an acquisition of stock or of assets, or a
successful bid for a contract, a company may assume direction of
work performed, prior to the takeover, by einployees represented by
a union and in accordance with a collective-bargaining agreement
negotiated between the union and the previous employer. The new
company's management, even if it considered potential labor problems, probably would confine precautions to a disclaimer of all
obligations under the old agreement.' Nevertheless, the union may
seek to force the new employer to abide by some or all of the provisions of the old contract, to bargain with it before imposing terms
and conditions of employment different from those in the old contract, or at least to recognize it. To be sure, many heatedly debated
questions about the new employer's obligations to do any or all of
these things have been laid to a comparatively quiet, though still
somewhat fitful, rest by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services, Inc.' But many of
the old questions persist, and new ones have been added by the
3
Court's decision.
The purpose of this article is to examine some of the implications of the Burns decision for management officials contemplating
a takeover and more specifically to consider the extent to which a
successor employer may be bound by the provisions of its predecessor's bargaining agreement. Although the article focuses on the
Burns case itself, some consideration also is given to the Court's
earlier decision in John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston4 and to the
*
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1. See, e.g., Hotel Employes Union v. Howard Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, U.S. - 94 S.Ct. 720 (1973); Eklund's Sweden House Inn, Inc., 203
N.L.R.B. No. 56 (May 2, 1973).
2. 406 LUS. 272 (1972).
3. See Christensen, Successorships, Unit Changes, and the Bargaining Table,. in
SOIr1IWESTERHN LEc.AI. FOUNDATION. LABOR LAW DEVEI.OPMENTS 1973, at 197; Wachs,
Suece.sorship: The Conasequences of Burns, 24 LAB. L.J. 221, 222 (1973).
4. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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question whether Wiley provides a means of avoiding the mandates
of Burns.
II.

NLRB

V. BURNS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES, INC.

For about five years prior to July 1, 1967, the Wackenhut Corporation, pursuant to a series of one-year contracts, provided plant
protection services for facilities of Lockheed Aircraft Service Company at the Ontario International Airport in California.5 On February 28, 1967, a majority of Wackenhut's employees selected the
United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPG) as their bargaining
representative in an election held after Wackenhut and UPG had
stipulated that the Lockheed facilities were an appropriate bargaining unit. On March 8, UPG was certified, and on April 21, Wackenhut and UPG entered into a three-year collective-bargaining agreement. On July 1, 1967, as a result of a successful bid for the contract,
Burns International Security Services, Incorporated, took over performance of the Lockheed plant protection services.
Prior to submitting its successful bid, Burns had been informed
of UPG's recent certification and of the existence of the bargaining
agreement. After being notified on May 31 that its bid had been
accepted, Burns hired 27 of the Wackenhut guards and brought in
fifteen of its own guards from other locations. As it signed on the
Wackenhut employees, Burns supplied them with membership
cards for the American Federation of Guards (AFG), a union having
collective-bargaining contracts with it at other locations, and told
them they had to join AFG. On June 29, Bums recognized AFG,
ostensibly on the theory that it had secured a card majority. On July
12, however, UPG requested that Burns recognize and bargain
with it. After Burns refused to do so, UPG filed unfair labor practice
charges, resulting in the issuance of a complaint, the holding of a
hearing, and a succession of appellate proceedings.
The National Labor Relations Board, with Member Jenkins
dissenting, adopted the findings and recommendations of the Trial
Examiner and held, inter alia, that Burns violated sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act' by refusing to
5. The factual narrative that follows is based upon the descriptions found in the decisions of the Trial Examiner and of the National Labor Relations Board, William J. Burns
Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970), of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971),
and of the Supreme Court, NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (5) (1970).
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recognize UPG and to abide by the 1967 Wackenhut agreement. 7 At
the outset, the Board noted and adopted apparently without critical
examination the Trial Examiner's finding that Burns was a successor to Wackenhut.' It then set forth what it deemed to be the ordinary, if not always hitherto recognized, consequences of such a finding. As Wackenhut's successor, Burns was obligated to recognize
and bargain with UPG as the collective-bargaining representative
duly selected by the majority of its employees, albeit prior to the
change in employers. This obligation, the Board added, included
"the negative injunction to refrain from unilaterally changing wages
and other benefits established by a prior collective-bargaining
agreement even though that agreement has expired." 9 Finally, the
Board held that, "absent unusual circumstances,"10 a successor is
required to take over and honor a collective-bargaining agreement
negotiated by its predecessor, regardless whether it expressly or by
clear implication has assumed any obligations under the agreement.
Imposing this obligation on a successor-and on Burns in particular-is essential, the Board reasoned, "to fully protect the employees' exercise of the right to bargain collectively and to promote the
maintenance of stable bargaining relationships and . . . industrial
peace. . . ."" It was not determinative that Burns had not signed
or otherwise formally adopted the contract. It Was sufficient that the
contract was "reasonably related to Burns through its takeover of
Wackenhut's Lockheed service functions and its hiring of Wacken2
hut employees.'
In its petition to review the Board's order, Burns contended
that (1) the Lockheed facilities were not an appropriate bargaining
unit, (2) Burns was not Wackenhut's successor, and (3) the refusal
to honor the 1967 contract was not an unfair labor practice even if
Burns was a successor. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
enforced the Board's order except for that portion requiring Burns
to honor the Wackenhut contract. The court held that "in ordering
7. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 348 (1970). The Board
also held that Burns had violated §§ 8(a)(1) & (2) of the Act by unlawfully recognizing and
assisting AFG. This holding was not contested by Burns.
8. See 182 N.L.R.B. at 348-49.
9. Id. at :349.
10. Id. at :350. As not infrequently happens, the "unusual circumstances" were not long
in occurring. See Emerald Maintenance, Inc., 188 N.L.R.B. 876 (1971).
11. 182 N.L.R.B. at 350.
12. Id.
1:3. Brief for Petitioner, William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRB, 441
F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Burns to honor the contract executed by Wackenhut, the Board has
'
exceeded its powers. t
Five Justices of the Supreme Court agreed, for the most part,
with all of the Second Circuit's conclusions and reasoning. All nine
Justices concurred in the lower court's finding that Burns was not
bound by the 1967 agreement."s At the outset, the majority noted,
but did not review, the Trial Examiner's finding that the unit was
appropriate. " It accepted the Board's findings that Burns had hired
a majority of the Wackenhut employees and that Burns' operations
did not differ significantly from Wackenhut's.' 7 Having thus disposed, almost summarily, of the complex and disputed factual determinations underlying the finding of successorship, the majority
had little difficulty in requiring Burns to bargain with UPG:
[Wihere the bargaining unit remains unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new employer are represented by a recently certified
bargaining agent there is little basis for faulting the Board's implementation
of the express mandates of § 8(a)(5) and § 9(a) by ordering the employer to
bargain with the incumbent union."'

The Court went on to hold, however, that the duty to bargain
in no way implies or includes an obligation to honor a predecessor's
collective-bargaining agreement. So much at least is apparent from
the decision. Less apparent is the rationale of the Court's holding.
The problem first was approached from the standpoint of Congress'
reluctance to impose-or to allow the Board to impose-any particular contractual terms upon parties engaged in collective bargaining. This reluctance is expressed most notably, the Court pointed
out, in section 8(d) of the Act, which provides that the duty to
bargain collectively "does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession . . . . "' In H.K.
Porter Co. v. NLRB,.2 0 the Supreme Court had earlier issued its
authoritative interpretation of this provision, holding that it precluded the Board from requiring an employer to agree to a dues
14. 441 F.2d at 915.
15. Justice White, speaking for the majority, held that Burns was required to recognize
and bargdin with UPG, but was not bound by the 1967 agreement. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the minority, would not have required Burns to recognize UPG.
16. 406 U.S. at 277-78.
17. Id. at 278-80.
18. Id. at 281. The majority reached this conclusion despite the dissent's objection that
"it
is by no means mathematically demonstrable that the union was the choice of a majority
or the 42 employees with which Burns began the performance of its contract with Lockheed."
Id. at 297 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
20. 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
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checkoff provision, though its adamant refusal to do so was admittedly evidence of bad-faith bargaining. The economic and social
theories implicit in section 8(d), as articulated in H.K. Porter,
"underlay the Board's prior decisions, which until [its decision in
Burns] have consistently held that, although successor employers
may be bound to recognize and bargain with the union, they are not
bound by the substantive provisions of a collective-bargaining contract negotiated by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed
by them."'2
Several commentators since Burns have noted that the issue of
what contractual provisions, if any, should be binding upon a successor does not fit neatly within the framework of section 8(d) .22 The
language in the provision was aimed at a union and an employer
facing each other across the bargaining table and attempting to
hammer out a bargaining agreement not yet in existence. It is
doubtful that Congress, or the Court in H.K. Porter, considered the
issue of what obligations an employer should be held to have assumed when it voluntarily takes over the operations of a business
and the supervision of employees covered by an unexpired
collective-bargaining agreement.
Perhaps recognizing this, the Court discussed at length, and
appeared to rely heavily upon, what it described as the "serious
inequities" that would result from imposing a predecessor's bargaining agreement upon the successor:
[Hiolding either the union or the new employer bound to the substantive
terms of an old collective-bargaining contract may result in serious inequities.
A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if
he can make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force,
work location, task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an
employer with the terms and conditions of employment contained in the old
collective-bargaining contract may make these changes impossible and may
discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital. On the other hand, a union may
have made concessions to a small or failing employer that it would be unwilling
to make to a large or economically successful firm.n

Whatever the merits of these social and economic speculations, they
afford a more logical basis for the result in Burns than does section
8(d).
21

406 U.S. at 284.

22. Christensen, supra note 3, at 203; Note, Labor Lau'-Successor Employers-Duty
to Honor Predecc.sor's Collective BargainingAgreement-NLRB v. Burns Int 1 Security
Services. 14 B.C. IND. & Co.M. L. RF.v. 193, 195-200 (1972); Note, Contract Rights and the
Su(cvs.%or Employ'er: The Impact of Burns Security, 71 MiCH. L. REv. 571, 576-78 (1973); cf.

United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 339 F. Supp. 302, 306 (N.D. Ala. 1972).
2:1.

406 U.S. at 287-88.
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Finally, the Court held that Burns did not violate section
8(a)(5) when it unilaterally established the initial terms on which
it employed the former Wackenhut employees." Burns, the Court
reasoned, could not have changed any preexisting terms of employment because it had no prior relationship to the bargaining unit and
because there were no outstanding terms of employment until the
duty to bargain accrued on July 1, 1967, when Burns completed its
hiring.
III.

SUCCESSORSHIP

AND THE CONFLICT WITH

Wiley

If a union invokes Board processes to force a successor to observe the bargaining agreement concluded by the prior employer, its
claim probably will be denied on the authority of Burns as an infringement upon freedom of contract and upon the employer's
right to rearrange its business.- What the Board has denied, however, may well be obtainable, at least in part, from court and arbitrator on the authority of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston," which was distinguished
but not expressly overruled in Burns.-*That the two decisions emphasize different purposes of our national labor law is apparent."
Almost equally apparent is that the attempted reconciliation of the
two cases by the majority in Burns is an uneasy one at best. While
we mean eventually to chart a tentative course we believe the law
should follow here, our discussion ought to begin with a brief retelling of the facts in Wiley and of the efforts by the Burns majority
and minority to distinguish the prior case.
In Wiley," the Supreme Court required a corporate employer
(Wiley) to arbitrate under a bargaining agreement between a union
24. Id. at 292-95.
25. See. e.g., Good Foods Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Nov. 30, 1972); Milwaukee
Engine & Equip. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (July 21, 1972); St. Antoine, Judicial Caution
and the Supreme Court's Labor Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 269,
276 n.35 (1973).
26. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
27. See Hotel Employes Union v. Howard Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489 (6th Cir.), cert.
granted, - U.S., 94 S. Ct. 720 (1973); United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum
Co., 339 F. Supp. 302, 306 & n.4 (N.D. Ala. 1972); Allied Employers, Inc., CCH LAB. ARB.
AWARDS 8037, at 3145 (Jan. 29, 1973) (Foley, Arbitrator).
28. See St. Antoine, supra note 25, at 276. For a discussion of the varying emphases
given the conflicting goals of industrial peace and freedom of contract prior to Wiley and
Burns see Wellington, Freedom of Contract and the Collective BargainingAgreement, 112
U. PA. ,. R v. 467 (1964).
29. The following description is based on the Court's account of the facts. 376 U.S. at

M446.

19741

BARGAINING AGREEMENT SURVIVAL

and another corporation (Interscience) that had merged with Wiley.
At the time of the merger, Interscience was a relatively small concern, having a single plant and approximately 80 employees, 40 of
whom were represented by the union. Wiley had approximately 300
employees, none of whom was represented by a union. Before and
after the merger, the union and the respective employers were unable to reach any accord on the effect of the merger on the collectivebargaining agreement and on the rights under it of the Interscience
employees hired by Wiley. Wiley refused to recognize the union as
bargaining agent or to accede to its claim that certain rights of the
Interscience employees had vested under the Interscience bargaining agreement and were binding on Wiley. Shortly before the expiration date of the Interscience agreement, the union commenced an
action under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act",
to compel arbitration. It asserted no bargaining rights independent
of the agreement, seeking only to arbitrate claims based on it. Wiley
at no time agreed to be bound by the Interscience bargaining agreement.
The Court, in ruling upon the union's claim, first held that
federal law controlled and that it was the policy of our "national
labor laws" to emphasize the settling of labor disputes by arbitration. The Court concluded that it would weaken this policy if "a
change in the corporate structure or ownership of a business enterprise had the automatic consequence of removing a duty to arbitrate
previously established . . . . "3,The right of employers to rearrange
their businesses and even to eliminate themselves as employers had
to be balanced by some protection of the employees from sudden
changes in the employment relationship. "The transition from one
corporate organization to another will in most cases be eased and
industrial strife avoided if employees' claims continue to be resolved
by arbitration rather than by 'the relative strength . . . of the contending forces.' ",2 That Wiley had not signed the contract did not
override the "impressive policy considerations favoring arbitration. ' ':3' In addition, the Court noted that the collective-bargaining
agreement is not an ordinary contract, but a unique document,
resulting from bargaining obligations imposed by law and intended
to serve as the governing instrument for an industrial enterprise.
.30. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
31. 376 U.S. at 549.
32. Id., quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
580 (1960).
33. 376 U.S. at 550.
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For the duty to arbitrate to survive, however, there had to be
"substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise."3
Otherwise, imposition of the duty to arbitrate would be "something
imposed from without, not reasonably to be found in the particular
bargaining agreement and the acts of the parties involved."" The
Court found proof of "continuity of identity" primarily in Wiley's
hiring of the Interscience employees." Moreover, the Court concluded that the duty to arbitrate did not expire merely because the
Interscience employees did not constitute a majority of Wiley's work
force or even an appropriate bargaining unit: "The fact that the
Union does not represent a majority of an appropriate bargaining
unit in Wiley does not prevent it from representing those employees
who are covered by the agreement which is in dispute and out of
'37
which Wiley's duty to arbitrate arises.
The majority in Burns attempted to distinguish Wiley on three
grounds: (1) Wiley was a section 301 suit to compel arbitration, not
an unfair labor practice proceeding in which the Board is expressly
limited by the provisions of section 8(d); (2) Wiley rested in large
part upon the preference of national labor policy for arbitration; and
(3) the decision was made against a background of state law holding
the surviving corporation in a merger liable for the obligations of the
disappearing corporation. 8 Without more, these points seem undeniably correct but dubiously significant. 9 The emphasis on the differences between a section 301 suit and an unfair labor practice
proceeding and on the preference for arbitration suggests that the
issue was a jurisdictional one, and that the union simply selected
the wrong forum. But the Court's reliance in Burns upon the principle of freedom of contract and its evident desire to ensure the free
transferability of assets belies such a narrow interpretation of its
holding. The emphasis on state law seems to be at odds with the
express holding in Wiley that federal law controlled, though the
Burns majority may have intended only to indicate that a transfer
of assets is essential to a finding that contractual obligations survive
a change of employers."
34. Id. at 551.
35. Id.
36. "Although Wiley was substantially larger than Interscience, relevant similarity and
continuity of operation across the change in ownership is adequately evidenced by the wholesale transfer of Interscience employees to the Wiley plant, apparently without difficulty." Id.
37. Id. at 551 n.5.
38. 406 U.S. at 285-87.
39. See St. Antoine, supra note 25, at 272-73.
40. The Court was careful to point out that "there was no merger or sale of assets, and
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Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissenters in Burns, followed
a much different line of reasoning in distinguishing Wiley and in
concluding that Burns was not bound by the Wackenhut bargaining
agreement. The Justice objected not to the Board's interpretation
of what obligations a finding of successorship entailed, but to the
very finding of successorship itself. He observed, preliminarily, that
there was no evidence that UPG was the choice of a majority of the
Burns employees or that the unit was appropriate. The Board's and
the majority's conclusion on those points rested on questionable
presumptions or on the pro forma findings of the Trial Examiner.
The imposition of a duty to bargain could be justified only on the
theory that Burns was a successor, a concept left undiscussed but
implicitly relied upon by the majority.'
According to Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of Wiley, "one
of the bases for a finding of successorship is the need to grant some
protection to employees from a sudden transformation of their employer's business that results in the substitution of a new legal entity, not bound by the collective-bargaining contract under contract
law, as the employer, but leaves intact significant elements of the
employer's business."4 But protection of these expectations cannot
be extended indefinitely, under the guise of the neutral application
of a principle of successorship, without conflicting with other recognized aims of national labor policy-the right of an employer to
rearrange its business, the right of employees to select their
collective-bargaining agent, and the right of free collective bargaining itself." For Justice Rehnquist, the proper balance between these
purposes is struck by narrowly defining the circumstances in which
successorship will be found:
Wiley . . . speaks in terms of a change in the "ownership or corporate structure of an enterprise" connotes at the very least that there is continuity in the
employer to perform an obligation voluntarily undertaken by the predecessor
employer. . . . The notion of a change in the "ownership or corporate structure of an enterprise" connotes at the very best that there is continuity in the
enterprise, as well as change; and that that continuity be at least in part on
the employer's side of the equation, rather than only on that of the employees.
If we deal with the legitimate expectations of employees that the employer who
agreed to the collective bargaining contract perform it, we can require another
employing entity to perform the contract only when he has succeeded to some
of the tangible or intangible assets by the use of which the employees might
there were no dealings whatsoever between Wackenhut and Burns. On the contrary, they were
competitiors for the same work ....
406 U.S. at 286.
41.

406 U.S. at 297-99; see id. at 280 n.4.

42. 406 U.S. at 301.
43. Id. at 301-04.
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have expected the first employer to have performed his contract with them."

The differing views of the majority and of the dissent on the
obligations of a successor are not necessarily irreconcilable. The
majority noted, at the outset, that its resolution of the questions
presented turned to a large extent on the "precise facts involved
here." It also acknowledged that in some situations a successor
might be bound by the contract of the predecessor: "[I]n a variety
of circumstances involving a merger, stock acquisition, reorganization, or assets purchase, the Board might properly find as a matter
of fact that the successor had assumed the obligations under the old
contract."4 Nevertheless, the majority's broad language emphasizing the need to encourage the transfer of capital is hard to square
with the dissent's position that it is the transfer of assets itself that
may lead to the imposition of contractual obligations and a duty to
bargain.
IV.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF A SUCCESSOR

Without taking issue with any member of the Court or with
proponents of proposals for reconciling Burns and Wiley,47 we tender the argument that the reasoning of the Burns majority is
ultimately incompatible with the outcome in Wiley.4" The point can
best be approached by discussing two questions posed by the conflict between the two decisions: first, whether Burns established a
new test of successorship applicable to the Wiley situation, and
secondly, whether, consistently with Burns, a successor can be
bound through arbitration by the predecessor's bargaining agreement.
Burns had an obligation to bargain with UPG because a majority of the employees hired by it were represented by a recently
44. Id. at 304-05. Drawing a novel analogy to state bulk sales acts, Justice Rehnquist
added that "the doctrine of successorship in the federal common law of labor relations accords
to employees the same general protection against transfer of assets by an entity against which
they have a claim as is accorded by other legal doctrines to nonlabor-related claimants
against the same entity." Id. at 305.
45. Id. at 274.
46. Id. at 291.
47. See, e.g., Note, Labor Law-Successor Employers, supra note 22, at 212; Note,
Contract Rights and the Successor Employer, supra note 22, at 582-90; Comment,
ContractualSuccessorship: The Impact of Burns, 40 U. CHI. L. Rsv. 617 (1973).

48. The following discussion is confined to the Wiley holding that the successor was
required to arbitrate. We do not contend that Burns is in any way inconsistent with the
holdings in Wiley that federal law controlled and that the arbitrator determines issues of
procedural arbitrability.
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certified bargaining agent." Although the Court suggested at one
point that the bargaining duty arises only when the successor plans
to or does retain "all of the employees in the [predecessor's]
unit, '" "' it is, or must be, the hiring by the successor of the predecessor's employees as a majority of its own work force that triggers the
duty to bargain. Otherwise, as one commentator has noted, a wouldbe successor could avoid any duty to bargain simply by hiring all
but one of the predecessor's employees." Moreover, the successor
might be forced to bargain with what would be in effect a minority
union if the hiring of all-or a majority-of the predecessor's employees were the test. Instead, the language about hiring all of the
predecessor's employees was intended, it appears, to suggest the
narrow range of situations in which the duty to bargain might arise
prior to any formal hiring.. 2 In addition, the percentage of the predecessor's employees hired may well be an indicator of continuity in
the employing industry. If only a small percentage of the predecessor's employees are hired, "discontinuity" seems apparent, even
though the employees may constitute a majority of the successor's
work force. "3:'
It is arguable, of course, that the majority hiring test is inapplicable to a Wiley situation and controls only when the union seeks
recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent for all of the successor's employees or all of the employees in an appropriate unit. The
reasoning supporting the test applies equally, however, in each instance. The test seeks to avoid the difficulties-and potential illegality-of requiring the would-be successor to bargain with a minority union, and the difficulties are just as real when, as in Wiley, a
union seeks to represent only a minority of employees for purposes
of arbitration." If the successor is already unionized and is forced
to arbitrate with an "outside" union representing employees of the
acquired predecessor, the successor's relationship with the union
49. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
50. 406 U.S. at 295. As one commentator stated: "It is unclear whether Justice White
considers the critical 'majority' to be (1) a majority of the predecessor'semployees going into
the successor's work force, or (2) a majority of the successor's work force coming from the
predecessor employer, or (3) both." St. Antoine, supra note 25, at 271 n.12.
51, Wachs. supra note 3, at 230.
52. See id.
53. See Atlantic Technical Servs. Corp., 202 N.L.R.B. No. 13 (Mar. 5, 1973); cf. Goldberg, The Labor Law Obligations,of a Successor Employer, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 735, 749-51
(1969).
54. See McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 988 (1966).
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representing a majority of its employees might be severely impaired,
especially if arbitration led to the creation of a group of employees
with higher benefits.
The majority hiring test used by the Burns majority appears,
then, to state a prerequisite to the imposition of any kind of successorship obligation. 5' Under that test, Wiley would not have been a
successor.
Assuming that the successor satisfies the majority hiring test,
the question remains whether it might be held bound, through arbitration, to some of the provisions of the predecessor agreement. At
the outset, it should be noted that requiring the successor to observe
the contract of the predecessor is impossible to square with the
Court's holding that a successor is ordinarily free to set the initial
terms and conditions of employment." That freedom means little
if an arbitrator can block the successor's efforts to run the business
in a new way by forcing on it provisions of the old agreement. This
suggests that the basic rationale of Burns is inconsistent with the
holding in Wiley that the successor had to arbitrate under the old
contract and might be obligated, ultimately, to honor some of its
provisions. The Burns majority stressed the free transferability of
capital and the setting of terms and conditions of employment
through the interplay of economic forces. To say that these policies
are hardly novel is an understatement. They have been relied upon
by the Court in other contexts,57 are embodied in section 8(d), and
are basic axioms of a free enterprise economy.
Of course, there is no way of proving conclusively that absolving
a successor of any duty to honor a predecessor's agreement will
always and everywhere make capital more transferable and terms
of employment more reflective of the economic strength of the parties. But we submit that common sense and practical experience tell
us that in most instances it will further these aims. More important
55. This statement is not intended to imply that a company is necessarily a successor
when a majority of its work force is composed of one-time employees of a business it has taken
over. It is still necessary to find that there is continuity in the employing industry.
56. The Court's holding on this issue is consistent with, and indeed almost compelled
by, the holding that Burns was not bound by the Wackenhut agreement. Depending upon
the length of the unexpired term, there would often be little practical difference between
holding a successor bound by the predecessor's contract and requiring it to bargain before
instituting inconsistent terms of employment. See NLRB v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 468 F.2d
96:3, 972 (7th Cir. 1972) (Stevens, J., dissenting), vacated, 411 U.S. 912 (1973); NLRB v.
Wayne Convalescent Center, Inc., 465 F.2d 1039, 1043 (6th Cir. 1972).
57. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
58. See generally Swerdlow, Freedom of Contract in Labor Law: Burns, H.K. Porter,
and Section 8(d), 51 TXAS L. REv. 1 (1972).
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fbr present purposes, the reasoning in support of the result in Burns
applies with equal force to the Wiley situation. There is no basis for
arguing that a contract, or some part of it, should be binding upon
a successor if enforced by an arbitrator, but not if enforced by the
Board. Imposing this obligation, in whatever forum, restricts the
free transfer of capital. The would-be successor cannot know at the
time of the takeover just what obligations some third party, be he
arbitrator or Board member, might later find it had assumed. While
an arbitrator, because he has greater flexibility in interpreting contractual terms, might be able to impose upon a successor obligations
consistent with the economic strength of the parties, that result
would be largely fortuitous, since most collective-bargaining agreements are silent about what obligations are to survive a change of
employers.
The dissenters in Burns, it is true, distinguished Wiley on the
ground that a transfer of assets and dealings between the parties
were involved in that case. Under such limited circumstances, they
indicated, certain contractual obligations might survive a change of
employers and be enforceable through arbitration. But these circumstances are neither limited nor rare. To make the transfer of
assets the touchstone of a finding of successorship and to require a
successor to honor the predecessor's bargaining agreement if successorship is found, as the dissent proposes, would lead to the imposition of the predecessor's agreement in a wide variety and large number of corporate combinations and reorganizations. The dissent's
limitation on the successorship doctrine is no limitation at all and
is inconsistent with the policies of encouraging the free transfer of
capital and of facilitating business reorganization.
This is not to ignore completely the concern of the Court in
Wiley that employees be protected against sudden changes in the
employment relationship. It is merely a recognition that the balance
between protection of employee expectations and encouragement of
the transfer of capital is best struck by requiring only that the
successor bargain with the predecessor union when a majority of its
employees are former employees of the predecessor. It may be objected that this gives small protection to employee expectations
because the bargaining obligation may be avoided simply by not
hiring the predecessor's employeesr 9 But this is true even if contractual obligations are held to survive a change of employers, since
59. Under current Board decisions, a potential successor is not obligated to retain the
predecessor's employees. See Crotona Serv. Corp., 200 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (Dec. 5. 1972).
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retention of the bulk of the predecessor's employees has long been
deemed determinative evidence for a finding of successorship.11
Moreover, as a practical matter, a successor may find it difficult to
avoid taking on at least a part of the predecessor's work force. If the
successor does not intend to transfer employees of its own into the
newly acquired facility, it would have to hire new employees from
the general labor market, and for obvious reasons, the predecessor's
former employees might seek employment from the successor. They
could not be denied employment because of their prior union affiliation,6 1 and it would be difficult to find all of them unqualified. In
addition, the successor often may desire to retain the employees of
the predecessor since they may be both competent and familiar with
the operations of the plant. In short, the obligation to bargain with
the predecessor union not infrequently will be almost unavoidable.
The proposition urged herein, that the outcome in Wiley cannot
be squared with the reasoning in Burns, is not inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's most recent discussion of successorship. In Golden
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 2 the Court held that a "bona fide
purchaser of a business, who acquires and continues the business
with knowledge that his predecessor has committed an unfair labor
practice in the discharge of an employee, may be ordered by the
National Labor Relations Board to reinstate the employee with back
pay." In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly relied upon
the language in Wiley concerning the need to protect employee expectations from sudden changes in the employment relationship.
But it also noted that its conclusion did not in any way qualify its
earlier discussion in Burns: "[U]nlike Burns, where an important
labor policy opposed saddling the successor employer with the obligations of the collective-bargaining agreement, there is no underlying congressional policy here militating against the imposition of
liability.""
In effect, the Court found that imposing liability for the predecessor's unfair labor practice did not interfere with the successor's
right to rearrange its business. Left untouched is the reasoning in
Burns that imposition of the predecessor's bargaining agreement
does interfere with this right."
0. See Goldberg, supra note 53, at 750-51.
61. See NLRB v. Tragniew, Inc., 470 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1972); Central American
Airways, 204 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (June 14, 1973).
62.
- U.S. -,
94 S. Ct. 414 (1973).
63.
- U.S. at
, 94 S. Ct. at 418.
64. U.S. at -,
94 S. Ct. at 425.
65. The issue discussed above, the resolution of the conflict between Burns and Wiley,
may soon be resolved by the Supreme Court. On December 10, 1973, the Court granted
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U.S. -,
94 S.Ct. 720
certiorari in Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employes Union, (1973), in which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had held a successor obligated to
arbitrate under the predecessor's agreement. The successor had not hired a majority of the
predecessor's employees, nor did the predecessor's employees constitute a majority of the
successor's work force. The finding of successorship rested instead on the continuity between
the 2 businesses-the successor took over virtually all of the predecessor's assets, the location
and identity of the businesses remained the same, and the products and services were virtually identical.

